WHY SHOULD JURISTS CARE ABOUT THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION?
Keywords:
Philosophy of Action, Methodology, General Theory of Law, Moral Responsibility, Legal ResponsibilityAbstract
In the article, I articulate two paradigms in the philosophy of action, based on Davidson and on Anscombe (and to a lesser extent, on Peter Winch) and point out why jurists should be interested in discussions in this philosophical field. I will argue that the Davidsonian paradigm does not exhaust everything we want to know. The Anscombean paradigm, with its emphasis on the ideas of sense and understanding, is particularly useful in explaining the way in which we – concrete agents – engage in practices of responsibility in life and law. Next, I use the discussion in moral philosophy about our practices of responsibility as the focal point of the discussion. Our practices of responsibility depend on some conception of action to make sense, while at the same time they impose explanatory burdens on any theory of action. In the fourth section of the article, I return to the law based on an analysis of tort law. I will argue that the law can provide valuable insights into how to think about the notions of action and responsibility, while these same notions help us understand the law.
References
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CASOS CITADOS
EUA
Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co. (1928) 248 N.Y.
Reino Unido
R v Smith (1959) 2QB 35
R v Hughes (2013) UKSC 56
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