AGENCY THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE INFLUENCE OF TRANSFER AND PROMOTION IN AGENCY COSTS IN A FINANCIAL INSTITUION

Authors

  • Paulo de Godoy Universidade do Vale do Itajaí
  • Rosilene Marcon Universidade do Vale do Itajaí

Abstract

The capillarity of the financial sector, which performs its activities in several cities and consequently thousands of agencies demands, as a way to appropriately represent the institution, not only the promotion but also the transfer of executives to occupy management position in other cities and agencies acting as institutions' owners/stockholders institutions. This paper analyzes the existence of familiar conflicts originated from a promotion and/or transfer and if these eventual conflicts may influence the managers behavior, in extent to produce some agency cost. Thus, based on the Agency Theory and organizational conflicts literature, a group of managers in a Brazilian financial institution was researched. As a result of a questionnaire application, the managers consult their families during the promotion and/or transfer process and that process may generate conflicts. The results indicate that, according to the researched managers, they can be influenced by a promotion and/or transference situation, being able to have their performance jeopardized, generating agency costs.

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Author Biographies

Paulo de Godoy, Universidade do Vale do Itajaí

Aluno do Programa de Mestrado Acadêmico da Univali – Universidade do Vale do Itajaí

Rosilene Marcon, Universidade do Vale do Itajaí

Orientadora. Chefe de Departamento de Pós-Graduação da Univali – Universidade do Vale do Itajaí

Published

2008-07-30

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