



“ETHIOPIA WILL NO LONGER STRETCH HER HANDS TO THE ‘DEITIES’” – DISENCHANTING REVOLUTIONARY ETHIOPIA¹

Serawit Bekele Debele

Estudante de Ph.D. do Departamento de Estudos da Religião na Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies (Bigsas) da Universidade de Bayreuth (Alemanha). Pesquisadora da mesma instituição. *E-mail:* serawit@envisionit.co.uk

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ABSTRACT

Early 20th century was an era when religion began to be heavily criticised by the Ethiopian intellectuals. Eliminating its influence from the political sphere was an issue they dwelt on. This criticism on religion continued towards the middle of 20th century. Accordingly, the Ethiopian student movement which culminated with the outbreak of a revolution in 1974 took up the criticism of religion as a factor that drew the country behind. The regime change in 1974 marked an important historical development as the state adopted a “socialist ideology”. This was followed by a rejection of religion as anti-progress and anti-revolutionary. Taking newspaper article titled “Beagul Limad Lay Zemecha (campaign against harmful custom)” by Delbage (1976), this paper attempts to analyse “disenchantment” in revolutionary Ethiopia. The article is a reflection of the time when religion became an object of criticism by the state. A disenchanted order is introduced by the writer through his discursive acts.

KEYWORDS

Disenchantment. Religion. Ethiopia. Revolution. Student movement.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the editorial of a student publication known as *Challenge*, a provoking statement that was critical of Ethiopia's

longstanding commitment to and hope on God of Israel was written. The editorial piece came out in 1972, two years before the revolution that brought an end to the imperial regime broke out. This was the time when the student movement was at the apex of its bashing of the feudal regime. Religion was one of the main agendas taken up by the predominantly Marxist oriented students who envisaged an Ethiopia divorced from religion and superstition. The editorial reads:

Ethiopian society must be *reorganised in toto*. Thus, the first order of business is to prepare systematically to create the revolution that will bring about the reorganisation of society on totally new foundation. [Following the revolution,] we will promote production and participate actively in scientific experiments, in the flourishing of peoples' arts and cultures. Then Ethiopia will no longer stretch her hands to the "Deities" that have bestowed her with 3000 years of misery (THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA, 1972, p. 7-8).

During the days of the imperial era, the emergence of a generation which was disappointed with religion is clear from the above editorial piece. Religion was regarded as an instrument of the feudal monarchy to justify and legitimatise their power. It was taken to be tolerant or even a stake holder in the exploitation of the mass during the imperial era. Above all, it was regarded as an entity which dragged the country from participating in scientific experiments in an era when the rest of the world had embarked on modernisation by doing away with religious influences. By analysing a newspaper article that came out in 1976, two years after the infamous revolution, this paper seeks to unearth instances of disenchantment and the historical developments that led to a disenchanted revolutionary Ethiopia.

Needless to say religion constitutes a huge part of the social, political and economic life of Ethiopians. Ethiopia has been portrayed in the literature as an "island of Christianity". Christianity, Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) from now on, was introduced into the Axumite Kingdom in the fourth century AD followed by Islam in the seventh century. Before the introduction of these two religions, the EOC claims that

there was Judaism as a result of which the country is said to have housed the three Abrahamic religions. In addition to the so called institutional religions, there were also other religious practices by different people in different times. Therefore, religion has been very much embedded in the social, economic and political realms. Particularly, the state and the EOC operated in close alliance until their official separation following the 1974 revolution. The EOC happened to assume a hegemonic position in the political, social, economic and cultural scenes of the country. Religion in general, and the hegemonic order the EOC established in particular began to be challenged by Ethiopian thinkers and intellectuals beginning from early 20th century. This marked the coming of times when religion stopped to be taken for granted by some sections of the society, particularly the educated elite.

2. ETHIOPIAN EDUCATED ELITES AND RELIGION

Yonas Admasu (2010), in a piece entitled "What were they writing about anyway?", discusses few writers who raised the issue of tradition and modernisation in Ethiopia in their writings, be it literary or otherwise. He also engages the reforms which they proposed for the betterment of the country. Accordingly, he clearly shows that different writers who lived in different times attempted to criticise the situation the country was in and proposed that change is necessary. Admasu (2010) brings to attention that religion was one aspect which needed reform according to those thinkers he engages. For instance, he asserts that Gebre-Hiwot Baykedagn was one of the pioneers who insisted on the separation of religion and politics as well as the introduction of religious freedom (ADMASU, 2010). Gebre-Hiwot (apud ADMASU, 2010, p. 66) writes:

[...] many are the people who may not understand the good in religious freedom. So it would do us good if we took note of the following. Our people believe that the *tewahido* faith is the most eminent among all the faiths. So be it, *but what good did it do us?*

Orthodox Christianity, which was “everything – at once religion, culture, way of life, and polity”, was challenged by the elites of early 20th century (KEBEDE, 2006, p. 825).

On the same line, Bahiru (2008) also states that religion, religious freedom, religious tolerance were few issues of deliberation by what he calls pioneers of change. He states that those pioneering thinkers have insisted on the relegation of religion to the private sphere leading to the creation of a more secular sphere where critical thinking was appreciated. These pioneering intellectuals, according to Bahiru (2008), rather took a progressive stance when it comes to the subject of religion. Religion according to the Ethiopian elites of 20th century is a thing of the conscience and something that should be left to the jurisdiction of God or gods. Emperors of the temporal world should only be concerned with the mundane and leave what is of the other worldly concern aside (ADMASU, 2010). As the only religion recognised by the Ethiopian empire, EOC was the main object of criticism by the pioneers as well as their successors who took up the request for a secular state structure. Begging for reforms of this kind in the early 20th century is a clear indication that “there indeed was an undercurrent of radicalism involved in the reforms envisioned by at least some of the pioneers” (ADMASU, 2010, p. 67).

Although the position of religion as carrier of an ultimate truth began to be challenged towards the beginning of the 20th century, the student movement of the 1960s and 70s can be taken as climax when religion as an ideology was defied and the idea of replacing it with some sort of alternative ideology emerged. The 1960s witnessed a more pronounced challenge directed at religious traditions. In this line, Admasu (2010, p. 78) writes:

[...] the fiction (I didn't say 'myth') of divine intervention in the affairs of the society was also being gradually deconstructed. We are now in the domain of history which requires, as it were, seeing things for what they are.

Thus, in the years before the revolution that brought the military regime in to the political scene, what Kebede (2008) calls “revolutionary atheism” has started mushrooming in Ethiopia. The EOC was mainly the target of criticism

although the notion of religion in general has been bashed by the radical students of the time. This, according to Kebede (2008, p. 119), is the result of the "revival of the culture of alteration" an alteration which was informed by Marxist Leninist ideology with which the Ethiopian educated elite was infatuated. This became the time when "an atheist doctrine so easily seduced a fundamentally religious culture" to an unprecedented scale.

For the students who have started expressing their scepticism towards religion, Marxist-Leninist ideology was regarded as a substitute. Kebede (2008, p. 129) argues that the students' weakened conviction to religion later paved the way for "avowed opponents of religious beliefs" to succeed in leading the student movement. He also asserts that;

In vain does one try to reduce the infatuation with Marxism-Leninism to the impact of grave social problems rather than to the disaffection with [religion]. The truth is that any supposition that Ethiopians could have become Marxists while remaining faithful to their traditional religion is untenable. Even if the majority of students claimed still to be believers, their devotion was shaky to say the least (KEBEDE, 2008, p. 127).

This was the context in which the revolution broke out and a self claiming socialist regime emerged in the country in 1974. This necessitated a historical shift in the religious landscape of the country. For once, the EOC's marriage to the state was "officially" brought to an end by the new regime. The state then adopted "secularism" as a governing principle.

In the period from 1974 to 1991, the separation of state-religion principle was coupled with an utter rejection of religion as a sign of backwardness. During this time, any religious affiliation was mostly regarded as anti revolutionary. In this line, Young (1997, p. 174) further asserts that the "Derg [the military regime] used its mass associations to urge people to end baptism, grieving ceremonies, fasting, and even attending church". At times, dismissal of affiliation to any religion was put as a condition to membership to the ruling party. Based on the regime's "public" stance on religion, few scholars like Wudu and Young went to the extent of characterising the regime as an "atheist" regime (TAFETE, 2006).

Although religious groups like Muslims, Protestants and Catholics welcomed the newly proclaimed religious freedoms, there was, to use Young's (1997, p. 177) expression, "disenchantment with the Derg". By the same token, the regime assaulted "traditional" religious institutions and their leaders. Destroying their temples and criminalising the leaders were few manifestations of how the regime related to those religious institutions and practices.

3. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF "BEAGUL LIMAD LAY ZEMECHA"

The article entitled "Beagul Limad Lay Zemecha" (campaign against harmful custom) came out on the government owned Amharic² daily newspaper known as *Addis Zemen* on 3 March 1976. It was written by Tsegaye Debalqe in response to a radio program hosted by an Oromo journalist in two local languages, Amharic and Oromifa in September 1975³. The radio program came out few days after the *Irreecha*, a traditional thanks giving ritual of the Oromo ethnic group was celebrated (DEBALQE, 1976). The program aired on the radio was mainly concerned with the meaning, purpose and celebration of *Irreecha*. *Irreecha* is both a prayer of request and thanksgiving depending on the context and time when it happens. If it takes place before it rains, people mainly ask *Waaqa* (meaning God in the Oromifa language), the creator, to give them good harvest, to protect their families and loved ones to pass the rainy season and be able to thank him when the sunny season comes. This one takes place on top of hills and it usually takes place around May a month when the dry season reaches its climax. On the other hand, during the *Irreecha* that

² Amharic was the national language during the imperial as well as the military regimes. Up on the introduction of ethnic federalism as a new state ideology and organising principle, it is announced as a working language in the federal state of contemporary Ethiopia.

³ According to the Ethiopian calendar, Tsegayes Debalqe article came out on Yekatit 23 1968 which in the Gregorian calendar means 3 March 1976. A week later on 30 Yekatit 1968 or 11 March 1976, Kuma Idea, the journalist who hosted the program on the radio, wrote a response to Tsegaye. In te response he wrote, he basically dismissed Tsegaye's criticism on *Irreecha* as irrelevant and something that emanated from ignorance.

takes place at the end of the rainy season and beginning of the new bright season, people gather by the lake side to thank *Waaqa* for the good harvest he gave them and for seeing them through during the rainy season. The radio program aired in September was concerning the celebration that was held in September by the lake side as thanks giving for *Waaqa*. Historically, the celebration has been represented in different newspapers since the imperial regime. In this paper, *Irreecha* as presented in a newspaper article as an example of backward and pagan practices is used to elaborate instances of "disenchantment" during the military regime (1974 to 1991). The journalist aired an elaborate program concerning the ritual and he interviewed people why they are celebrating the ritual which he later presented in the radio program. According to the journalist who hosted the program, the presentation of *Irreecha* on the media was an attempt to give a positive image to the religious ritual. Later on, *Irreecha's* appearance on the radio provoked this article I summarise and analyse in the next sections.

The newspaper article starts with explaining the meaning of *babil* (culture) and *limad* (custom) together with stating their difference. The writer gives us these two categories with which we frame our thought and on the basis of which we identify the good and the bad practices so that we, as readers, make a decision of which ones to leave out and which ones to retain. Accordingly, he says *babil* is something that entails "debate, deliberation, law, order, religious education, prosperity of intellect" (DEBALQE, 1976, p. 2). It also implies an intensive education in all aspects. Unlike *limad*, *babil* is permanent and entrenched. *Limad* is described as

[...] repetitiveness, infatuation, shallow knowledge. It is also narrower than *babil*. Moreover, it is temporary that withers away with maturity and deeper knowledge. It disappears in time giving way to culture (DEBALQE, 1976, p. 2).

Culture, according to the writer is an input for civilisation and civilisation is impossible in a context where *limad* prevails. It is only with advancement in knowledge and intelligence that civilisation flourishes. Culture creates a fertile ground for this development. Particularly, the writer insists

that socialism gives people tools with which they investigate the culture that would lead to civilisation and progress. Socialism also enables people to make the right decision in sieving custom out and retaining culture in their march towards civilisation. He regards culture as an aspect of civilisation while custom is regarded as a hindrance to progress. According to Debalqe (1976), people evolve to a stage where they realise that custom is dangerous for human development mainly if they engage in critical thought by endorsing the culture of questioning, reflecting and taking positive experiences from those who are already advanced. He makes reference to East and West Europe as civilised parts of the world from where Ethiopians have to get inspiration in their endeavour to change. In addition, he states that

[...] history of the developed world tells us that before the era of philosophy, science, technology, rationalism, religion, particularly magic, was governing every sphere of the life of people. Magic had a strong influence on people as a result of which they were forced to live in fear and speculation. This fear and speculation, which was the result of lack of critical inquiry, finally gave way to rationalisation and this brought an end to the power of magic (DEBALQE, 1976, p. 2).

Having provided the theoretical discussion on *bahil* and *limad*, the writer undertakes the task of analysing and critiquing what he believed was a backward custom on the basis of the categories he provided. He writes “in our country, pagan or alien practices or fear have not yet disappeared. Since they are still embedded, they need intensive ‘campaign to nurture critical thinking’” (DEBALQE, 1976, p. 2). In many parts of the country, he asserts, whenever there are natural or manmade disasters like lack of rain, earth quake war and so on, unless their cause is investigated properly, explanations for the mishaps are usually sought in religion and fear. He then adds that people lived in fear during the so called feudal regime. For this, he argues, spirit mediums and magicians were responsible because they invoked spirit of fear among the people so that they are afraid of their rulers. He refers to magicians as fruits of the feudal regimes and also people on whose spiritual might the feudal regime relied. They were invokers of

spirit of fear among the ruled to make them obedient to the feudal rulers. In addition to the invocation of spirit of fear in the community,

[...] even worse was the fact that the tree, the sycamore, the hill, the river, the lake and the wind breeze were given special power. The ignorant people were made to believe in and worship those items. In the past, no attempt has been made to articulate this action as ignorance and tell people to stop the prayers by the river or lake side. But now, under the leadership of the new socialism all these have to be examined and removed (DEBALQE, 1976, p. 5).

Debalqe (1976) then continues directly to the *Irreecha* celebration that was aired on the radio and accuses the journalist of leading the people on the wrong direction using the government media which is actually supposed to liberate people from the "unexamined worships". Moreover, the fact that the journalist gave *Irreecha* a positive image in connection with Moses, Noah and God, was strongly criticised. According to the writer, promoting superfluous and backward practices like this one using the media is equivalent to being an opponent of the socialist ideology, because socialism is against "prayers by the river or lake side". Regarding the media, the writer asserts that the media should rather be used to educate people about such superstitious practices instead of promoting them.

The writer contends that to leave superstitions aside and focus on accumulating knowledge is the only way to get what one needs. He insists that education should be focused on as a way out for the progress of the country. His strong belief in education and his scepticism of what he calls custom is captured in this paragraph:

[...] the power one gets from education and rational knowledge is greater than the power one can possibly get from praying near the river or lake. Except through knowledge and experimentation, the answer obtained through collective prayer is not yet confirmed. It is false to claim that a student can pass his exams without properly studying but by just revering stone and tree. It is suspicious to say a woman can give birth too by mere prayer at the lake side (DEBALQE, 1976, p. 7).

His scepticism towards *limad*, becomes even clearer as he raises rhetorical questions concerning what religious people believe in by saying

[...] in the past, it has been said that faith removes the mountain. But who believed and used it to remove them? Were people not suspicious as they heard about this? Is there anyone who believes that now? But now, education is giving us evidences that atomic or hydraulic bomb is removing the mountains. Who can be sceptical of this? It is this kind of concrete power that harmful customs cannot manifest or challenge (DEBALQE, 1976, p. 7).

The writer concludes the article by suggesting that one should be able to differentiate *babil*, *limad* and *haimanot* (religion). He also cautions the media not to transfer unexamined messages which misguide the public.

4. WHAT DOES DEBALQE'S ARTICLE TELL US ABOUT A DISENCHANTED ETHIOPIA?

My usage of disenchantment draws on Tsegaye Debalqe's (1976) distinction of *limad* and *babil* entailing a shift from backward customary practices to a more rational and civilised culture. Disenchantment here refers to a situation of alteration, a condition when superstitious practices give way to a culture of rationality, science, technology and deep knowledge there by necessitating transformation. This operationalisation resonates with one of the main aspects of Weber's notion of disenchantment which meant elimination of elements of magic and the reigning of rationalisation. Accordingly, using one of the most read newspapers back then, Debalqe (1976) introduces a new order of truth. Taking the historical context into account, one can argue that he was proposing a shift that answers to the demands of the new socialist ideology which was up to reorganising the society in a more rational manner. As has been noted from his article, he emphasises the need for a deep knowledge, civilisation, science and technology. He also calls for abandoning the *limad*, which he argues is irrational and a setback to progress. He positions culture and custom one against the other in hierarchical manner and then suggests

that culture is better than *limad* as it is more rational and promotes an entrenched knowledge that brings about the desired change in a society. In doing so, he introduces a shift from a *limad*, which is enchanted with magic and spirits to culture, which is disenchanting, marked by deep knowledge and rationality. This task of educating the public uses the news paper to teach the new regime of truth, truth that entails disenchanting sets of order articulated as forms of rationalisation. He introduces culture as a way through which a future is imagined and portrayed as a time of hope. The writer sees a future which is disenchanting, which carries technology and science, rationality etc and breaking away from the enchanted custom leads to a utopia he postulates. The writer also attempts to introduce a national culture that is delinked from its enchanted past, a past in which the ethos of religion was strongly felt in the political, social and economic life of the people. He discursively constructs an imaginary of a national culture which is informed by socialist ideology the country embarked on after the revolution of 1974. In doing so, he applies persuasive rhetoric styles by taking for instance the European experience of progress and civilisation as an inspirational example Ethiopia has to look up to. He proposes a disenchanting contour as a way to lead to advancement and civilisation. In such a manner, he takes up the task of transforming an enchanted national culture to a disenchanting one. The discursive practice Debalqe (1976) engages in emphasises on the past, the present and the future as temporal sites on the basis of which his proposition revolves. He makes reference to the past as a temporal site from which the new nation has to depart progressing towards a future which is emancipated from the influence of magic, sorcery and the resultant fear. The present for him is a temporal site from which the past is criticised and the future is envisaged. He makes his point on the need of progress, by detaching oneself from custom, through his movement in time. He compares the three temporalities and suggests a complete break from the past.

A critical reading of the article to elaborate instances of disenchantment begs for a serious consideration of the politico-historical context of the time of its production. In addition, the position of the writer is an important point to be taken into account to understand the whole situation. Wodak et al. (2009, p. 8) state that "particular discursive acts and the

situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded” are dialectically related. As a result, such arrangements in conversation with historical contexts are responsible in shaping discursive practices. As such, the discourses also affect the situation, institution and social structures as well as history of production (WODAK et al., 2009). Accordingly, a reading of Debalqe’s (1976) article should take these into account. The revolutionary era which took up a socialist ideology, came up with a different strategy of discursive formulation of a national culture. Its approach to national culture was a total opposite of the discursive strategy adopted by the imperial regime. Back then, national culture was framed by “one religion” which is EOC and “one language” which is Amharic. To be a true national of Ethiopia amounted to identifying with these elements of national culture to the extent that one had to abandon other religious as well as linguistic commitments. However, during the military regime, although it continued to build a unitary state, national culture got a new reframing, religion was left out as a defining element and it was replaced by socialist ideology. National culture hence became a product of socialism and efforts were geared towards the creation of a new imaginary of the nation. The shift from a feudal state structure to a socialist one entailed also the necessity of cultural transformation which in the case of Ethiopia meant a break with the enchanted past. Religion, which was believed by the new government as a symbol of feudalism was rejected and the new unitary state was imagined through a homogenising project under the rubric of socialism, which arguably is an alternative to religion but with more rational plans and projects of modernisation, progress and change. The enchanted past was a time when religion had a greater role to play in the state apparatus as much as in the processes of social formation of the time. Socialist Ethiopia had the task of removing this and replacing it with a more rational and progressive framework.

With regard to the writer’s position, he was western educated elite who has been serving in the national radio station as music composer until he was promoted to the ministry of culture, youth and sports as permanent secretary of the ministry. His position in the state apparatus substantiates the argument that he was acting as a government mouth piece to inculcate a certain form of knowledge to replace what has been in order

before. Moreover, a closer reading of the article reveals another layer of criticism which leads us question the influence of his own religious background on his representation of *Irreecha* as superstition. By making a distinction between religion and superstition, he clearly buys into the Weberian differentiation of the realm of magic and religion. Like weber, he does not necessarily reject religion rather sweeps the superstitious aspects of religion as things of the past and things which drag people from the project of progress. No matter how Debalqe's (1976) article seemed to be progressive in critiquing custom, he still was not saved from uncritically reproducing the relational magic-religion dichotomy. In his article, he clearly makes a distinction between religion and superstition. In doing so, he puts religion in category of culture which according to him is a more sophisticated strand while superstition is relegated to the realm of custom. Superstition for him is constituted by magic and sorcery to make societies live in fear. He makes a comparison between custom and Satan and equates both regarding the drastic impact they have on society. His comparison of Satan with custom is a clear indication of the limits of his critical take on religion. His, although subtly, subscription to Christian religious values comes out clearly in his attempt to equate Satan and custom. In the response Kuma, the journalist, wrote the next week, he criticises Debalqe's nostalgia of the old regime which posited religions in a hierarchical manner, Christianity being the first whereas indigenous religions are denied recognition. According to Kuma (1976, p. 2), Debalqe hardly "understands what socialism stands for. He is rather a remnant of the feudal regime" which was disrespectful to local traditions while it was appreciative of those imported values. Kuma (1976, p. 2) writes:

[...] unlike what Tsegaye tries to make us believe, socialism is all about respecting the cultural values of all ethnic groups. Denigrating people's traditions has been removed and it is a thing of the past. What we have now is socialism an ideology which regards all tradition as equal⁴.

⁴ The debate between the two was stopped by order after the second issue. In my interview with the journalist Kuma, I came to find out that Tsegaye was promoted due to his progressive stance. However, he was soon assassinated and according to Kuma, this was a punishment by *Waaqa* for his inappropriate statements against the Oromo religion.

Thus, one can argue that Debalqe's Marxist conviction was not strong enough to make him reject religion and superstition all at once. He rather opted to make a hierarchical distinction between religion and superstition and privileged religion as an element of culture which is not necessarily counterproductive to progress. Thus, his analysis of *Irreecha* as a backward practice is equally shaped by his Christian religious background as his socialist commitment.

One can also argue that Debalqe (1976) has been influenced by one of the intellectuals of early 20th century Ethiopia. Gebrehiwot Baykedagn (1993) was boldly critical of religion to the extent that he questions the importance of religion in the first place. Baykedagn (1993) argues that religion and religion related conflicts have kept Ethiopians lag behind from accumulating wealth and enhancing their knowledge. He emphasises that man is meant to control nature and thereby heading to civilisation. For him, progress is the ability to control nature which implies doing away with superstitions. If man is able to control nature, he is then able to control his own fate instead of relying on supernatural power or become a slave of fear. Breaking away from traditional life style is the necessary condition which leads man to achieve a higher state of knowledge and rationalisation. Debalqe's (1976) proposition as has been discussed above, borrows a lot from Baykedagn's (1993) treatise. Thus, the argument of Baykedagn's (1993) influence is sound in that it constitutes Debalqe's (1976) intellectual formation which is as much influenced by his western education as his Marxist inclination.

In conclusion, in their book *Worlds of power*, Ellis and Haar (2004) assert that one cannot understand African politics without making reference to religion, the spirit world in particular. I would however like to stress that, apart from making religion too strong a reality in the African political context, one needs to be more cautious so as not to take religion for granted. Although religion is embedded in the social, political and economic life of many societies in the world of which Africa is a part, it should however not be taken as the only framework through which one can analyse African politics. In this paper, I have tried to show that religion, particularly the spirit world, has in different times and places become an object of critique by political actors and the state at large.

“A ETIÓPIA NÃO VAI MAIS ESTENDER AS MÃOS PARA AS ‘DIVINDADES’”: DESENCANTAMENTO DA ETIÓPIA REVOLUCIONÁRIA

RESUMO

O início do século XX foi um período em que a religião começou a ser fortemente criticada pelos intelectuais etíopes. Eliminar a sua influência da esfera política era uma questão, então, existente naquele época. Essa crítica sobre a religião permaneceu em meados do século XX. Assim, o movimento estudantil etíope, que culminou com a eclosão da revolução de 1974, assumiu a crítica à religião como um fator que deixou o país para trás. A mudança de regime em 1974 marcou um importante desenvolvimento histórico, na medida em que o Estado adotou uma “ideologia socialista”, o que foi seguido por uma rejeição da religião como antiprogressista e antirrevolucionária. Com base no texto de Tsegaye Debalqe (1976) “Beagul Limad Lay Zemecha (campanha contra o hábito prejudicial)”, este artigo analisa o “desencantamento” na Etiópia revolucionária. Trata-se de uma reflexão do momento em que a religião se tornou um objeto de crítica por parte do Estado. Um desencantamento é introduzido pelo escritor por meio de seus atos discursivos.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Desencanto. Religião. Etiópia. Revolução. Movimento estudantil.

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